Current Forum: Session 1: Images and Representation	Read 10 times 	
Date: 15-Jan-2001 21:33:19	
Author: FRANK, KYLE G. <kgf4068@garnet.acns.fsu.edu>	
Subject: Re: Of Coconuts and Puppy Dogs 	
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       I would like to recognize Elizabeth for the nice job that she has done in discussing some of the critical points in Walter Lippmann’s two articles. I think that Elizabeth has shown that if we accept Lippmann’s premises and arguments, then we must necessarily accept the inevitability of stereotypes. Furthermore, I think that, given Lippmann’s premises, it is safe to describe stereotypes as necessary. 
       For example, Lippmann rightly points out that there is economy in visualizing our world according to preconceived stereotypes: “For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of the question” (“Stereotypes; Codes and Their Enemies”). He follows this assertion a description of “modern life [which] is hurried and multifarious.”  Even the tone of this section of the article employs short, chopped-up, “economical” sentences. It is as if in order to survive in the modern world, stereotypes really are necessary.
       Battle at Elderbush Gulch  demonstrates this principle. Clearly there are innumerable stereotypes, both positive and negative regarding the individual characters and groups of people in the film. An argument could be made that such stereotypes are demeaning and untrue (which, of course, they often are). However, attempting to portray the Native Americans and Whites in a more complicated (i.e. “realistic”) fashion would prove uneconomical for Griffiths—assuming that he recognized and desired to change the inaccuracy of the depictions. Not only would developing complicated characters require more film, research, and studio time, but also risk losing audiences. 
       I am not justifying Griffith’s film on an ethical or moral basis, but we must not forget its purpose. Despite the desire many have to analyze film as an art, its primary function, whether we like it or not, has been and continues to be entertainment—that is, to provide a certain amount of time in exchange for money. Griffith’s audience (according to Simmons, profiled as white male) most likely did not expect or desire an intellectual analysis of the Native American stereotype. If Griffith had forced this analysis, he most likely would have lost his audience. Bernard Berenson noted this about the painter who “does not visualize objects exactly as we do” (quoted in Lippmann). We reject this artist’s (in our interest, the filmmaker) work as insincere. As a result, stereotypes create and facilitate economical exchange between the filmmaker and the spectator. I fear that to expect humans to resist this exchange seems preposterous, especially if accept Lippmann’s ideas.
        Setting this discussion aside, I would like to ask some questions that I hope generate some responses from others. I find that there are some theoretical issues that Lippmann overlooks in his arguments about stereotypes. Although it would be cumbersome to completely outline these ideas here, if there is anyone interested in discussing them, I would be willing more fully to explain myself. 
        First, Lippmann identifies reductionism as one of the dangers of stereotypes. We carry with us preconceived images all “categories” of people that filter the facts we see. Thus, we will see a person exhibiting characteristic “x” because of his or her race, gender, nationality, etc. Disallowing variance among the individuals reduces the categories into a “self-and-other” dichotomy. I think that Lippmann falls victim to that which he criticizes, i.e. he creates a dichotomy between the expert who is aware of stereotypes and the ignoramus. Lippmann’s tone reveals a belief that he belongs on the “good” side of the dichotomy, because he recognizes the stereotypes. 
       Second, Lippmann goes through great pains to convince the reader of human fallibility when it comes to observation. His example of the Congress of Psychology in Gottingen demonstrates that even the majority of trained observers fail to observe the facts. Later, Lippmann exalts the “moralist that submits to the scientific discipline” and denounces “the dogmatist . . . [who believes himself to share a part of the insight of omniscience, though he lacks the criteria by which to tell truth from error.” Thus, Lippmann is exalting scientific observation, yet he also admits the limits of even trained observers to observe “the facts”. Lippmann qualifies only the observation of evidence by those who “see” what he sees; he is enacting the very behavior that he disparages.
       Last, I make this observation with tongue-in-cheek, but could not resist the temptation.  Lippmann asserts that human nature is such that “our attention is called to those facts 
which support [our system of stereotypes] . . . So perhaps it is because they are attuned to find it, that kind people discover so much reason for kindness, malicious people so much malice.”  If this is true, and Lippmann discovers so much reason for errors of judgment, does this mean he is erroneous? =)